By Ramzy Baroud  

Western and Arab allies reject joining the war on Iran not from principle, but from a clear expectation of failure.

Speaking on Sunday, March 22, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called on world leaders to join the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, framing Tehran as a global threat.

“If anyone needed an explanation of why Iran is the enemy of civilization, and the enemy and the danger to the entire world. You got it in the last 48 hours,” he said, during a visit to the site of an Iranian missile strike in the southern city of Arad.

Days earlier, on March 17, US President Donald Trump criticized NATO allies for refusing to participate in the war, calling their position a “very foolish mistake.” He later escalated his criticism, on March 20, branding them “cowards” for staying out of the fight.

These appeals—and the visible reluctance that followed—tell a far more revealing story than official statements about restraint or neutrality.

But don’t believe the hype: if Europe, along with Arab governments, believed that the US-Israeli war on Iran—launched on February 28—had any real chance of success, many would have already joined.

This may sound like an overly harsh conclusion, especially as leaders across Europe and the Middle East insist that “this is not our war.” But history tells a very different story. With few exceptions—Spain, Oman, and a handful of others—Western powers and pro-US Arab regimes have rarely been guided by principle. Their record is one of calculated opportunism, shaped by risk, reward, and the likelihood of victory.

To understand their current hesitation, we must rewind.

In 1990-91, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, Washington swiftly assembled one of the largest military coalitions in modern history. Under the banner of international law and with explicit UN Security Council backing, the US framed its intervention as a limited mission: the liberation of Kuwait.

That framing mattered. European powers, along with key Arab states, joined eagerly. The war was seen as legitimate, winnable, and foundational to shaping a new post-Soviet order in the Middle East under American leadership.

But by 2003, the calculus had shifted. The US invasion of Iraq was no longer about reversing aggression; it was about regime change, wrapped in the rhetoric of the “war on terror.” This time, major European powers, most notably France and Germany, openly resisted. It was then that US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld famously dismissed dissenting allies as “old Europe,” elevating a group of more compliant governments in Eastern Europe – the “new Europe”.

Unable to recreate the legitimacy of 1991, Washington cobbled together what it called the “Coalition of the Willing”—a loose, politically constructed alliance that included countries with limited military contribution but symbolic value. Britain, under Tony Blair, became the most prominent partner, tying its fate to Washington’s most controversial war in decades.

Yet even then, reluctance did not equate to principle. Once Iraq was invaded and its state dismantled, the same international actors—whether they had supported the war or not—moved quickly to secure their share of influence. Energy contracts were signed, reconstruction deals distributed, and foreign governments inserted themselves into the management of post-invasion Iraq. The spoils of war, it seemed, were far more attractive than the risks that preceded them.

The war in Afghanistan reflected a similar pattern. After September 11, the US successfully rallied NATO and dozens of partner countries under the language of counterterrorism and collective defense. At its peak, the war effort involved troops from over 50 countries. Once again, allies were willing to commit when the mission appeared ‘justified’, coordinated, and likely to yield strategic returns.

The war on Iran, however, offers none of these assurances.

It is the least rational, least defensible, and most dangerous of all recent US-led military ventures in the Middle East.

Unlike Iraq or Libya, Iran is neither isolated nor structurally weak. It is a large, cohesive state with a population nearing 93 million, a vast geography, and a domestic military-industrial capacity that allows it to sustain prolonged confrontation.

Iran has demonstrated the ability to strike targets across the region and beyond, while maintaining a network of regional allies and partnerships, along with strong political ties to major global powers such as China and Russia.

Equally important is the absence of a credible political framework. There is no UN mandate, no coherent coalition, and no clear endgame. Instead, what exists is a volatile partnership between an impulsive US president and an Israeli leadership whose ambitions extend far beyond Iran itself.

Donald Trump has spent years undermining trust among traditional allies, destabilizing global economic relationships, and governing through unpredictability. War, under such leadership, becomes not a calculated strategy but a dangerous gamble.

For European and Arab governments, the question is no longer whether Iran should be confronted, but whether Washington can be trusted to manage the consequences of such a confrontation. Increasingly, the answer is no.

As for Benjamin Netanyahu, his objectives are neither limited nor concealed. This is not simply about neutralizing Iran’s capabilities. It is about reshaping the entire regional order in ways that would ultimately subordinate even Washington’s closest Arab partners and challenge the autonomy of regional powers like Türkiye.

Such a vision offers little incentive for participation, even among historically compliant allies.

It is therefore not restraint that explains the current distance of Europe and Arab regimes, but calculation.

Had this war carried the appearance of legitimacy, the promise of victory, and the prospect of material or political gain, the familiar coalition would have already taken shape.

If a more predictable US administration—one capable of mobilizing alliances and cloaking intervention in legal justification—were in power, the response might well have been different.

But this war offers none of that.

So the illusion must be discarded. Europe is not rejecting war. Arab governments are not undergoing a moral transformation. They are doing what they have always done: assessing risk.

And in this case, the conclusion is unmistakable: They are staying out not because they oppose the war—but because they believe it will fail.

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